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CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE PUBLIC INTERESTI
(Incidentally, herein, of the consumer stake in labor problems)
By Reed Dickerson*
An adequate history of the ever-shifting position of the consumer has yet
to be written. When it is, several facts will stand out.
Of these the most important will be the emergence of a significant parallel
between the positions of the unprotected consumer and the unprotected
laborer. Both, it seems, have come to exist in an economy dominated by
huge concentrations of capital born of the so-called Industrial Revolution.
More specifically, the growth of modern technology and the rise of complex
fabrication and mass production into "clusters of private collectivisms"
have meant that any supposed balance of power between the economic
entities whose interplay of mutual demands and concessions gave to Adam
Smith's self-regulating economy its motive power has been drastically upset.
Realization of this fact has been manifest on labor's part by the rapid growth
of unionization. Of greater interest to the consumer have been such projects
as the consumer cooperative or the Temporary National Economic Com-
mittee's recent investigation of the concentration of economic power in
private hands.1
The effects on the consumer of the new technology and of its attendant
congelations of capital have been manifold. One crucial development since
World War I has been the emergence of an acute merchandizing era in
which the dominant concern of industry is no longer with production for
human need but with the distribution of products on terms dictated largely
by industry for its own ends. As competition has declined, the ultimate
consumer has been persuaded to take not so much what he would otherwise
have preferred as what the business man has guessed he wanted or ought to
want, or in many cases merely what the business man has had to dispose
of. This has come in large part as a natural accompaniment of production
for an indefinite and impersonalized market where frequent over-production
t This paper grew out of a project undertaken at Columbia University in connection
with Professor Patterson's graduate seminar in Legal Philosophy. Professors Llewellyn,
Lynd, Handler and Alexander, (of Columbia) and Asher Isaacs (of the University of
Pittsburgh) will recognize here and there the budding of more recent suggestions. The help-
fulness of these men is gratefully acknowledged.
* Senior Attorney, Office of Price Administration. The opinions expressed are, of course,
personal.
I See Economic Power and Political Pressures, Monograph No. 26, Temporary National
Economic Committee, Washington, D. C., U. S. Gov't Printing Office, 1941.
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or the use of dated obsolescing models has resulted in forced distribution
through such persuasions as the high-pressured encouragement of install-
ment credit, or where on the other hand underproduction is ofttimes
motivated by a desire to maximize profits rather than to satisfy human
want.
Not only has this disparity in collective strength militated against the
individual unorganized consumer but the very technological forces which
have produced for him in many cases a superior product have in the same
stroke rendered him correspondingly less capable, as compared with those
with whom he must deal, in differentiating the better from the worse.
This lag of consumer literacy behind technological advance is found, for
example, in the replacement of simpler ingredients by synthetics (rayon,
plastics, etc.) and in the development of elaborate goods like vacuum
cleaners, packaged foods, and box spring mattresses, with their many
technical qualities well concealed from the consumer. Added to this, the
uninhibited creation of superficially unique "kinds" of products through
the exploitation of minor differences, distinctive packaging and brand
names together with the endless multiplication of unstandardized grades
and sizes have made consumer confusion the worse confounded.
The net result has been a David and Goliath relationship-but minus
the slingshot. It poses the complex social problem whether David is to
be protected by attempting to increase his collective girth, by arming him
more adequately, or by furnishing him with a governmental bodyguard, or
by destroying or disarming Goliath, or by some combination of these
measures. Yet, one thing is clear. The ultimate consumer's welfare cannot
be left wholly to the tender mercies of much stronger private interests whose
normal profit objectives are only partially concerned with the fulfillment of
his needs.
Of course, the plight of the consumer has hardly gone unrecognized. An
inventory of the multiform protections already available to the consumer
makes an almost impressive aggregate. Besides such extra-legal helps as
the co-operative, the magazine "institute", the advisory facilities of pro-
fessional associations like the American Medical Association, the Better
Business Bureau, and "confidential" services like Consumer's Research
and Consumer's Union, there are many legal protections. On the directly
regulatory side are state and federal food, drug and cosmetic laws; safety
and sanitation regulations in connection with the manufacture of clothing,
bedding and electrical equipment; licensing laws regulating on the one
hand the production of such commodities as spirituous liquor, bakery goods
and milk or on the other hand the vending of articles by auctioneers, brokers
and peddlers; statutes regulating advertising and labeling; statutes govern-
ing the possession and sale of dangerous commodities like gasoline and
firearms; laws protecting trade marks and guarding against the passing off
of one's articles as those of another ("unfair competition"); and in war time
emergency, measures like rationing. On the money side are anti-trust
[Vol. 8
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
legislation, installment sale and usury restrictions, and, with the coming of
war, direct price control.
In addition to statutes whose main purpose is direct protectory regulation
by the state, the law has furnished certain weapons and protections to be
wielded by the consumer himself. Thus in private legal controversy, he
has the advantage of doctrines of negligence, fraud and deceit, duress and
undue influence, the law of warranty, laws protecting in some instances
the title of the bona fide purchaser fcr value and doctrines of rescission
and avoidance in cases of incapacitation through infancy, insanity and
sometimes marriage.
Some of these laws are designed primarily for the protection of the con-
sumer; others benefit him only incidentally. But each poses a special
problem in social engineering where economist and lawyer and sociologist
must work hand in hand to produce a socially satisfactory result. Un-
fortunately, consumer protection has been sporadic, a series of mostly
unrelated attempts to deal with only the more acute instances of consumer
vulnerability. Legal protection of the consume has developed now to the
point where it is pertinent to inquire whether a more articulate and unified
philosophy of consumer protection is not now needed. Legislatures need
social criteria in framing -wise legislation, and judges much guidance in
interpreting ambiguous statutes or in "making" law where legislation
affords no specific answer. Particularly is wisdom desired where sound
statutory construction is meaningless except in terms of recognized aims.
Some appreciation of the needs of the consumer has made itself felt, for
example, in the courts' construction of §15 of the Uniform Sales Act, a
section dealing with implied warranties generally and presuming in its
intricacy a certain minimum of deliberation by seller and buyer that exists
in many sale-types but hardly in all. Sound results are being achieved in
the highly informal and casual transaction which is typical of the sale of
food at retail, where contrary consequences might well be found to flow
from the application of the self-same provisions of the Sales Act to articles
purchased less frequently or purchased by a type of buyer more sophisti-
cated than the ultimate consumer. But hunch judgments leave the course
of decision haphazard and, where inarticulate, give small guidance to the
less intuitive tribunal.
Nor is the broad problem one merely of extending and unifying a frag-
mentary movement avowedly on the consumer's behalf. While a great deal
has been done to bolster his position, much has been contrived to undercut
it. Over-protection of patents, protective tariffs and resale price main-
tenance laws are symptomatic of legislative attitudes which have been
sharpened by pressure groups in an attempt not only to give full preference
to business demands but even to identify business with the public interest
itself. How recently the billboards proclaimed, "What's Good For Business
is Good for Your Family." Likewise, labor pressures have focused only on
immediate labor objectives, in even greater disregard of consumer welfare.
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Realizing, therefore, that the strength of the consumer position is only
relative, we must go beyond the mere consideration of positive consumer
aids and weigh with similar scales business and labor measures which
ultimately affect the all-important consumer bargaining ratio.
The most elementary of consumer philosophies should take into account
two fundamental factors: 1.) the normal adverse disparity of bargaining
power between the individual consumer and those with whom he deals,
and 2.) the nature of the consumer interest, an interest which analysis shows
to be complex rather than simple, and one which is thus variously exposed
to injury. On the assumption that the former aspect is either self-evident
or already adequately documented, and without essaying the development
of a comprehensive philosophy of consumer protection', I propose to con-
sider some of the main features of an adequate consumer rationale, prin-
cipally the second of these two main considerations, the nature of the
consumer interest.
The slow development of the cooperative movement tends to confirm the
suspicion that the spending aspect of economic life, being little induced by
technological or monetary pressures to form into units and patterns under
conscious leadership, is organized with greater difficulty than the earning
side. For one thing, the universality of the general interest in consumption
has largely resulted either in its being taken for granted or never being
completely understood. So long as buyer and producer supposedly met
face to face and on even terms in a local economy where personal reputations
were of paramount importance, the antagonisms of their immediately con-
flicting positions were resolved without undue injustice to either. But in a
world in which an organized all-powerful production now deals with the
ultimate consumer only as a nonhuman abstraction, and in which the
minute division of individual responsibilities forms only a tenuous thread
for his protection, it becomes of first importance to know and understand
the precise nature of, so that we may adequately protect, the "consumer"
of whom it is usual to speak so glibly.
WHO Is "THE CONSUMER"?
Is the consumer merely one who uses? A distinction is normally taken
between those material wants which are termed "consumer" wants
("economic goods that directly satisfy human wants") and those which
are called "capital" wants ("economic goods destined for use in pro-
duction"). And yet, whether a man buys a set of golf clubs or a lathe for
his machine shop, he buys to satisfy a material human want. In recognition
of this fact, the differentiation is frequently phrased in terms of "ultimate
consumer" and "industrial (or commercial) consumer." But even this
terminology misleads. To say that the industrial consumer of a lathe is
not in the realest sense the ultimate consumer of the lathe is to confuse the
lathe with what the lathe helps to produce. Literally, the "ultimate
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consumer" would seem to include any buyer who uses an article in accord-
ance with its various utilities.
For present purposes the significant differentiation is found in the differ-
ing degrees of sophistication and bargaining strength of these buyers as
compared to their respective sellers. We don't indulge our sympathies
quite so much for the industrial purchaser of capital goods because generally
speaking he is supposed to know what he is about. Thus, so far as the broad
problem of consumer protection is concerned, it is only the crude correlation
between commercial use and buyer sophistication that gives validity to a
consumer classification phrased in terms of use, a classification however
which in practice has been worked out largely in accordance with actual
needs for protection. Confirmation of the latter point is found in those
marginal commodities like fountain pens and passenger automobiles, which,
though they may only play integral parts in the productiori of other specific
commodities, are universally classed as "ultimate consumer" goods.
Although this betrays the present inadequacy of a "use" differentiation,
most of what follows is considered nevertheless in terms of the "non-com-
mercial" or "non-industrial" consumer (even using those words accurately)
because it is true that consumer vulnerability lies predominately in that
area.2 Nonetheless, it will be apparent that in many instances what is
said of the "ultimate consumer" is equally pertinent to the commercial
and industrial buyer.
The second peculiarity of "the consumer," whether we speak in terms
of economics or of law, is that he is not merely one who "ultimately" con-
sumes, nor can he be defined solely as one who consumes what another has
produced. In fact, one could hardly name a law which enures to the benefit
solely of the consumer as consumer, except in so far as his consumption
is somehow ancillary to a contract of purchase and sale in which the con-
sumer is an active participant or its immediate beneficiary. Similarly, the
science of price economics finds itself confined largely to studying the con-
sumer at the point where he impinges upon the rest of the economic system,
a contact which occurs where the seller matches the buyer's wit and a sale
is accomplished. In short, our "consumer" is for most practical purposes
nothing more than the buyer for consumption, whether it be his own or
that of an immediate beneficiary; and his wants are considered only as of
the moment of sale.3
2 It is interesting to note in this connection that the limiting effect on the usage of the
word "consumer" caused by the necessity of concentrating protective attention in the
non-commercial area has narrowed the connotations of the word to the point where in the
minds of most laymen "consumer" is synonymous with the narrower concept of "ultimate
consumer."
s "It is in the capacity of 'chooser' rather than as 'user' that the economist... becomes
interested in the consumer." Kyrk, The Economics of Consumption (1923) 5. This does
not mean that post-purchase enjoyment and the time dimension of use (durability, etc.)
are ignored, but only that such qualitative aspects are viewed and controlled principally
through the sale transaction.
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This view of the consumer is not wholly arbitrary, because it defines not
so much the interest in consumption as it does some practical considerations
in social reckoning and control. As a consumer a man cannot ascertainably
affect the economic system except as he also becomes a buyer or acts through
one. 4 Nor can the law adequately afford him the protection he requires
without transactional handles to grasp.5
And yet, is it true that he requires special protection? The knowledge
that everyone is a consumer in some degree has encouraged the assumption
that his interest as consumer requires no such consideration, and the
position is supported by the argument that no one will consciously work
against his own interests. N.R.A. Administrator General Hugh Johnson
was said to have asserted that special consumer representatives were not
really needed under the N.R.A., because the Presidenth imself represented
the consumer!6
The man who consumes, of course, has many other interests besides
those immediately involved in satisfying his material wants. Many of
4 Throughout the remainder of this discussion the word "consumer" will stand as a
shorthand expression for "consumer-buyer".
5 Although this transaction is ordinarily a sale, it could be a gift, lease, or loan. But
consider the existing law. It may be true that the injured donee of a gun which the donor
had reason to believe had a defective barrel can recover in tort for negligence, and it is true
that the donor is in a real sense a consumer as he shoots the gun. But since the donee
would be as fully protected if he were only an innocent bystander (Restatement Torts (1938)
§§405, 388, 408) the law in protecting the donee is protecting him as a man under general
notions of culpability, and his capacity as consumer is only an incidental and indeter-
minative aspect.
Where money or other value passes in exchange for the transfer, the quality of the
transferor's or supplier's conduct must be higher, it is said. But even where chattels
are supplied under a contract not techlnically a sale (e.g., in many states food served in a
restaurant, or chattels supplied by contractors for use by employees of others in work to
be done under a contract) we have at most the near-sale and courts tend to predicate
liability for injurious defects upon actual culpability. See Prosser, Torts (1941) 687;
Restatement, Torts (1938) §388 et seg. and §§405-8. But the law doesn't approach the
protection of the consumer as consumer until with the sale it raises warranties of quality
(not available to "bystanders") or absolute liability in tort under the guise of a pretended
negligence (see especially the food cases). In this connection observe the gyrations of a
Texas court straining in a recent decision to find consideration for a gift of a bottle of
Coca-Cola by a retailer of gasoline to a prospective customer, in order that the strict
accountability of warranty could be imposed on the bottler in favor of the injured donee.
However, the strain was a little too much, and the court, after toying with the consideration
idea, played safe and rested its decision on the more time-honored fiction of negligence.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Kerlee, (No. 14156, 2nd Sup. Jud. Dist. of Texas, 12-20-40),
CCH Food, Drug and Cosmetic Service, p. 18, 377.
Thus consumers (in the broadest sense of the term) are ordinarily protected by law in
two ways: (1) incidentally, through laws designed to protect the public in general from
certain risks, and (2) specifically (so far as possible), through laws effecting transactions
leading up to consumption (the law: warranty, or negligence; the transaction: sale).
6 Lynd, The Consumer Becomes a "Problem" (1934) 173 Annals 1, 3. For a criticism
of this viewpoint, see Campbell, Consumer Representation in the New Deal (1940) pp. 263
et seg.
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the matters which occupy him in his non-consuming phases are either
directly antagonistic to, or have some ultimately injurious effect on, his
interests as a consumer. The trite example is the retail merchant whose
family and financial responsibilities are large and whose immediate concern,
therefore, is not so much the quality of meat he vends as the probability he
will be able to keep his children's stomachs full without missing the monthly
rent. True, the food he saves for himself is adequate, but what, of the
unappreciated retribution in the form of a broken connecting rod or a
shirt that shrank too much? Or consider the over-reaching labor union
which pursues only immediate labor gains in disregard not only of com-
paratively minor quality or price disadvantages which these union members
may have to accept as future consumers of the article they make, but also
of the large cumulative losses in satisfaction and purchasing power to be
suffered reciprocally in the purchase of many articles fabricated by similarly
shortsighted groups.
The surest key to clear thinking on this score is the realization that in
the broadest sense of the word the "consumer" is not a differentiated man
or group of men 7 but the abstraction of a generalized class of interests
which is common to all men and which, being but partial, far from represents
their total individual orientation. Whole men do not behave in real life
as one-sided abstractions in the theoretical ether and the consumer interest
is hardly intelligently served without special isolation and representation.
I am a "consumer" at breakfast and as to my clothes and pen at eleven, but
in another aspect I am also a "producer" or "laborer" contributing to
forces which, through a causal nexus too tenuous specifically to forecast,
may well be insuring for me some ultimate consumer disappointment. And
so, although it may be true that no man "will consciously work against
his own interests," it certainly does not follow that none will unconsciously
do so.
"Consumer" denominates not a particular man, nor moreover even a
constant aspect of a man, but a role in the relationship between buyer and
particular products which he wants. No one is a consumer in vacuo except
in the sense that the term may serve in broad economic discussion to sum
up the individual's interest as buyer in the aggregate of his then wants.
Where particular controversies are involved, however, the real man wears
7 Kyrk, supra note 3, pp. 1-2. "Any economic system or process of making a living
is a part or aspect of the organic life of the individual person or groups involved. It is not
a separate mechanism or arrangement designed or constructed or operated by anybody
to supply a group of people called consumers with goods or services, or to distribute to a
group called employees amounts of money called wages or salaries, or to provide a group
called investors with dividend or interest checks, or to pay taxes to a group called govern-
ment officials. Neither such a mechanism nor these groups of people really exist at all.
(italics supplied) .. .People, individual human persons, are the only things there are in
any economic system and in any political system. Apart from them there is no such
thing as "business" or "government," or even "society." See National Industrial Con-
ference Board, Studies in Enterprise and Social Progress (1939) p. xii.
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his consumer guise in the market only by virtue of the fact that he bears
the relationship of buyer or potential buyer to an individual product. In
particular situations, therefore, the consumer interest is always a relational one.
When we say, on the one hand, that "everyone is a consumer", we mean
only that everyone wants at least something which is purchasable, though
not necessarily the same thing or things. Here the consumer class is a
wholly undifferentiated group with no peculiarities whatsoever.8 As such
an undifferentiated everybody-capable-of-buying, the "consumer" has little
or none of the group self-consciousness possessed by the "laborer" or
"producer", who unlike the consumer are groups apart. In particular
controversies, however, the consumer interest is always a relational one
where the "consumer" is differentiated from the "non-consumer" by virtue
of the fact that the latter has no desire for the kind of product in question.
But even a differentiation by product gives to the consumer no such com-
mon adhesive, necessary to group self-assertion, as it gives through intimate
personal association to the laborer or producer or seller. Hence it must be
plain that if the consumer group is not to be broken faggot by faggot in the
bargaining struggle, its interest in procuring the given product upon
equitable terms must be protected by safeguards imposed in large part
from without.
In any discussion of consumer problems, therefore, it is necessary sharply
to distinguish four useful but overlapping concepts, all of which unfortunate-
ly have been associated with the tag "consumer": 1.) "The consumer"
8 Under one scheme of economic analysis, the consumer is a differentiated group, distinct
therefore from a residual group of "non-consumers." Wyand, The Economics of Con-
sumption (1937) pp. 97-102. Its basic assumption is that people are ordinarily classified
in terms of their major interest orfunction (e.g., "doctor," "preacher," or "stenographer").
If this generality is raised to the dignity of a principle of classification, "consumer" becomes
the name for that group of real persons whose general roles as buyers for consumption are
more important to them than their roles as producers. Mr. Wyand himself prefers to
emphasize dominant function rather than dominant attitude. "Thus the individual who
creates as much as or more than he personally consumes is functionally a producer. Con-
versely, those whose consumption exceeds their productivity are consumers."
For some purposes, such a definition has undoubted merit. For one thing, it tags
those persons who are most likely to be self-conscious about their interests as buyers for
consumption. But in the general matter of the protection of buyers for consumptions
the validity of this kind of definition would depend on the question able assumption that
we needn't worry too much about such "non-consumer"-buyers of consumer goods because
if gypped or otherwise adversely affected, their losses are more than compensated for by
their gains as producers. Such an assumption is unwarranted because it distinguishes
the "consumer" from the "non-consumer" buyer of the same product solely on the basis
of differences in purchasing power. Despite our dearth of tears for the well-heeled sucker,
we must remember that there are disappointments other than mere money ones. Not
even the rich "producer" wants his belly tainted with malta fever germs or otherwise to
be disappointed with the quality of the product he buys, be it replaceable or not. And even
from the pure money angle, there is no reason why we shouldn't protect Wyand's
"producer"-buyer along with the "consumer"-buyers, assuming the seller's or manu-
facturer's conduct to be economically or socially unjustifiable.
[Vol. 8
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(usual relational sense) comprising all those who want a particular product;
2.) "The consumer" (broad economic sense) comprising all those who have
wants satisfiable by purchase, without regard to nature of want or product;
3.) "The individual consumer", meaning any person who is a member of
either of the two foregoing consumer classifications; 4.) "The real man",
meaning human beings as such in the totality of their interests, consump-
tive and non-consumptive.
In this duscussion, the word "consumer" will be used primarily in its
relational sense, except where the context indicates otherwise. This
approach accords with the fact that in the market most men act like con-
sumers only when they are buying or contemplating buying particular
products. The broader concept is frequently helpful, but the unfortunately
indiscriminate use of a single label on several referents carries danger of an
inadvertent transfer of connotations.9 Since we have but one word for two
of our four concepts, we proceed at some risk.
"THE CONSUMER" IS NOT "THE PUBLIC"
Not only is there a tendency to confound consumer interest with the
extra-consumptive interests of particular human beings, but a similar con-
fusion exists between the consumer interest and what may be termed
"the public interest."
One of those who proclaim that the consumer interest coincides with
that of the public is Professor Ben W. Lewis. Says he, "Of course, any
single consumer has a special personal interest as well as his interest as one
of the body of consumers in general in defending his position in given
transactions against overreaching pressure and demands from other special-
interest groups, but any positive special interest of consumers can at most
relate only to an immediate, short-run concern of individual consumers or
particular goods in particular transactions."' 10 But, he adds (concerning
goods produced by child labor)"It is difficult for me as a consumer to distin-
guish between my satisfaction in obtaining goods of the desired quality and my
satisfaction in obtaining goods produced under conditions of which I approve.
I doubt whether the first is to be denominated a 'consumer' satisfaction,
and the second, properly, a 'public' satisfaction.""
There is some naivete, of course, in assuming that the purchaser of
Bubblemeyer's Supreme Baloney on a rainy Wednesday is carefully
balancing social interests as he pays over his money. Consumer's Union
may be otherwise, but it is safe to say that the average consumer cares
very little whether his whiskey is bottled by child labor or sweatshop
slaves, and he cares still less when he can get it at a bargain. But Mr. Lewis
9 See Chafee, The Disorderly Conduct of Words (1941) 41 Col. L. Rev. 381, 387.
10 'Consumer' and 'Public' Interests under Public Regulation (1938) 46 J. Pol. Econ.
97, 102.
11 Id. at p. 102. (Italics supplied.)
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was probably asserting only that we may pass over immediate consumer
demands to what in the long run is objectively "good for him" as a con-
sumer and identify only the latter with the "good of society". Even if
this be his position (more on this in a moment) it is difficult to justify his
subsequent assertion that "the consumer" is entitled to equal representation
in the bargaining struggle with producers, owners and laborers only to the
extent that his immediate wants are consonant with those of society. This
contention is unfortunate, because as a practical matter individual con-
sumers will hardly be found running to any governmental or private con-
sumer advocate so unbiased that it will first perform the self-same job of
measuring the limits of socially legitimate demands that belongs properly
to the legislature or court or administrative tribunal itself.12 A more
"realistic" approach would recognize that the minimum consumer pro-
tection is necessarily based on a frankly partisan assertion of the consumer's
position, not only as regards what consumers "ought" to want but also as
to what they are actually demanding.
But quite apart from the practical requirements of adequate consumer
representation, any view which purports to identify the consumer with
the public appears to be misconceived. The kind of consumer to whom we
can give best practical consideration is the buyer for consumption and his
immediate beneficiaries. Again, he is only an economic abstraction and
the actual interests he represents include but a part of the total range of
human values. To identify him with the public at large, as Lewis does,
is to lose the interest in consumption in the larger whole, leaving it in-
adequately understood and inadequately represented. 13 On the other hand,
12 "We would never think it appropriate for a man placed in the position of protecting
the public interest to act primarily as an agent for labor against the owners, or for him to
act primarily in the interests of an owner against labor. We would call on him to balance
the two interests against each other as the case for each was argued before him (italics supplied)
... to place any Government official in the position of having to represent both the public
interest and the consumer interest of the public is to make him both judge of all parties
and prosecutor for one of the parties at interest. Probably no single element in the think-
ing of the past year has done more damage to the consumer than this confusion." Means,
The Consumer and the New Deal (1934) 173 Annals 7, 14. See further Campbell, supra
note 6, p. 264 et seg.
1 When he assets that "It is difficult to discover any divergence between the interests
of the public and those of the total consuming group" (supra, note 11) (italics supplied)
Lewis is talking of consumers-in-the-abstract, which of course includeseverybody (Definition
No. 2). But, as Means points out (see infra, note 15) there is still a difference between
the interests of everyone as consumers and their total interests as real persons. Moreover,
Lewis' analysis gives no weight to the fact that in particular controyersies (the only kind
practical economists are interested in) "the consumer" who seeks representation is never
larger than the existing market for the article in question (Definition No. 1). Comprising
normally a much smaller group than "the public" this body may have interests quite
adverse to those of the public. Furthermore, I can't see how merely representing "the total
consuming group" is representing anybody at all as consumer. What kind of "represent-
ative" is it that is "for you" in the abstract but unwilling to assert the only phase of your
interest which is exposed in the particular controversy?
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to confuse the public interest with the narrower interest of society in
material consumption is to close one's eyes to other interests of equal
validity. It is all very well to say that the thing which gives meaning in
the first instance to invention and research, as well as to the more prosaic
"job", is the fulfillment of material human needs. But it is something else
again to assert with Adam Smith14 that these activities are pursued only as
means and not also as more immediate ends in themselves. The laborer is
entitled to enjoy his work and the producer to exist as something other
than a slave to the consumer.' 5
It seems appropriate at this point to attempt a tentative formulation
of the consumer interest as related to the public interest.
Practically, it is essential to know first the nature and scope of the
actual demands of particular buyers for consumption, whether or not those
demands be consonant with their own long-run interests as persons or
consumers, or with like interests of fellow consumers of the particular
product, or with the interests of "non-consumers." This short-run interest
of particular individuals in the given product we may term "actual buyer
demand." It is also necessary to consider the consumer interest in this
product in its ordinary consumer-in-the-aggregate sense, usually implying
some degree of mutual concession by individual consumers (e.g., standard-
ization for mass production). This is the normal "short-run" consumer
interest. Further, assuming full enlightenment as to the ultimate effects
of fulfilling immediate demands without reservation, we may assume a
number of "long-run" interests possessed by the consumer. Thus, individ-
ually and in the aggregate, consumers of the given product should, as real
persons, consider their interests as possible future consumers of the same
product, their several interests present and prospective in other products,
and severally their manifold interests of a non-concumptive nature.
Tempered then with one or more of these considerations, a short-run
consumer interest becomes a "long-run" consumer interest.
14 "Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production' and the interest of the
producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that
of the consumer." Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Canan's ed., 1937) p. 625.
15 Means expresses this viewpoint emphatically. "In meeting any specific situation it
is essential to recognize that the public interest and the consumer interest are not identical.
First the public interest covers all spheres of human activity-religious, political, economic,
social-while the consumer interest is purely in the economic sphere. Second, the con-
sumer's interest is only one of the many interests involved in our economy; it is the interest
of buyers rather than of owners, or workers, or producers, or sellers. To confuse the
public interest with the more specific interest is to lose sight of the even-handed balance
which is implicit in the term "the public interest." true, all persons are consumers, and
also, the public; but the public interest embraces the whole. Even as it applies to the
economic field alone, the public interest calls for the protection of the owners of industry,
the managers of industry, and the workers of industry as well as the consumer." The
Consumer and the New Deal (1934) 173 Annals 7, 14. Also: Campbell, supra note 6, pp.
109-110, 263 et seg. Lewis' theory, of course, would also protect the laborer. "Con-
sumer" and "Public" (which includes inter alia "Laborer").
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The "public interest," which is in itself a long-term interest, is that
calculus of long and sometimes short-run interests which produces the
maximum of value for society. It is indefinite in content, but it is far
from being a meaningless generality. A proper balance of conflicting
general interests is a necessary goal, and the mere fact that precision is
impossible in effectuating a workable result in no way detracts from the
desirability of making the best compromise possible in a world of human
fallibility. But even if "consumer" is substituted for "public," the problem
of reconciling immediate demands with what is ultimately for the best still
remains, if only on a smaller scale.
Let us examine, therefore, the actual immediate demands of buyers for
consumption to discover if possible the extent to which they must yield
to some long-run consumer interest and to which, in turn, the latter may
successfully be reconciled with that most inclusive of interests, the "good
of society."
WHAT THE CONSUMER WANTS
(WHAT HE OUGHT TO GET IS A DIFFERENT STORY)
Generally speaking, the first of the two primary concerns of the ultimate
consumer, his "substantive" stake, is the interest in satisfying by purchase
(and within his resources) the material wants which at the time prompt
him to act. Here we could list all of the consumable goods now produced
and many others besides. For the present, it is sufficient to classify them
roughly into (1) food, drugs, and cosmetics, (2) clothing, household goods,
luxuries, and personal devices used in business or sport, (3) gas, water,
light, and telephone, and (4) miscellaneous items, including such quasi-
goods as insurance, loans, and securities purchased for investment. This
classification, a loose but useful one from a lawyer's standpoint, is made
according to the nature of the goods sought. Economists and psychologisst
like to go further and carve the consumer himself. 16 For present purposes,
however, we are not interested in how or why a man wants what he wants.
The question is, what does he want and to what extent is he entitled to get
it?
18 Wyand, for example, finds the consumer with needs, which produce wants (feelings
on the part of an organism that something is lacking and a vague groping after what is
missed). Wants are primary (essential to survival) and secondary (cultural). From
wants sprout desires (want fqcusing itself on specific areas of satisfaction). These are
"biological", "technological," and "sociological," and, needless to say, myriad. Among
the advertising and selling experts, Cowrie likes his consumer in three chunks, while Starck
finds sixteen pieces more digestible. For the psychologists, Jung sees three complexes of
instincts: (1) self-development, (2) social welfare, and (3) continuance of race. Laird,
taking a curbstone position, says that men are ultimately motivated by the unconscious
desires for adequacy, romance, life, and masculinity. And so.on without apparent limit.
See Wyand, supra note 8, pp. 3 (note), 120-122, 139, 152, 154. For Lough's analysis
and a combination of Dunlap's and Poffenberger's lists, see Waite and Cassady, The Con-
sumer and the Economic Order (1939) pp. 134-135.
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But the satisfaction of the immediate material need hardly exhausts the
interests of the buyer for consumption. With an eye on the possibility of
saving something for future purchases, he is equally desirous of attaining
his present wants at the cheapest price he can gracefully get away with
paying. If he is not always as heartless as this might seem to imply, he is
at least extremely careless about inquiring into the circumstances sur-
rounding the manufacture of the article in question or as to those matters
which now induce the retailer to offer it at a higher price than he may feel
inclined to pay. Here is the second primary consumer demand in the
transaction which makes him a consumer-buyer and it will be termed his
"pure price interest."
It should be clear that neither of the consumer-buyer's two primary
demands is fully compatible with "the good of society" or with the long-
run interests comprising it.
For one thing, there are a number of consumer demands which in their
very inception are considered to be incompatible with the public interest.
Among the socially illegitimate wants, for example, narcotics, alcoholic
liquors, tobacco, firearms, contraceptives, abortifacients, pornographic
literature, gambling apparatus, and slaves have at various times been
included. Also, otherwise proper demands are sometimes held to be unful-
fillable, wholly or to a degree, for reasons growing out of special circum-
stance. So with rubber needs in a nation at war.17
And in a number of respects, even from their own selfish point of view,
consumers must compromise immediate wants in favor of more permanent
enjoyments. Standardization, though neglecting the quality refinements
of minority and individual needs, must be condoned in the interests of
meeting the demands of quantity and general "knowability."' I Moreover,
particular consumers can hardly insist that desirable quality standards be
enforced faster than technology can meet them for consumers-in-general of
that product. Meat and milk, for example, might be more impure than one
theoretically ought to consume, and yet any statute seeking to prevent 9
their sale before the large mass of farmers and packers were practically
able to meet the legal requirements would drive these items from the
menu (and both farmer and packer into insolvency).
The public interest restricts the consumer's interest in buying the given
article at the lowest price quite clearly in the case of sales and luxury
17 If we treat the government as consumer, this is an inter-consumer (individual) problem,
resolved in favor 9f the government for reasons of obvious public policy. War-time
hoarding is likewise an inter-consumer problem.
18 It is interesting to note, however, that this "concession" may be more theoretical
than actual in view of the finding of a Hoover-appointed commission that under mass
production the consumer has a wider selection than ever. Recent Social Trends, Report
of President Hoover's Research Committee, Vol. II, p. 858.
19 Distinguish sharply here the pressure which stops the sale from that which furnishes
only a moderate incentive to comply with desirable standards.
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stamp taxes, although in these cases the added burden on the consumer,
except for some inconvenience, is probably slight; of graver concern to him
are "hidden taxes." Also there are tariff acts which not only maintain
higher price levels for both domestic and competing foreign goods but in
some cases preclude altogether the consumer from purchasing a superior
article. The consumer's desire for a low price makes him a party in interest
also in problems of wage and hour legislation.
All this is significant because it shows a clear necessity for some sacrifice
of actual buyer demand to the general short-run consumer interest as well
as for concessions by the consumer not only to his own long-run interests
but to the interests of the producer and laborer and the public at large.
More difficult are those broad areas where policy considerations are diffuse
and where the extent to which mutual concessions must be made by the
consumer, producer, owner, and distributor is subject to wide differences of
opinion. What, for example, is the legitimate consumer stake in the
Miller-Tydings Act and the state "fair trade" laws, which permit the en-
forcement of resale price maintenance? Is it overbalanced by any legitimate
interest of the retailer, wholesaler, or manufacturer?
Further, to what extent is the consumer entitled to a true and full dis-
closure of facts concerning the article he purchases? The buyer, at all
odds, is not interested in every detail which may have affected the compositi-
tion or manufacture of his product, and it would be placing an impossible
burden on the seller to require the inclusion of a case history with each sale.
At the other extreme, public policy clearly forbids the use of explicit and
deliberate falsehoods as selling inducements. Between these extremes, we
are faced with the more controversial puffing, the material failure to disclose,
and the false implication. These matters include broad questions as to the
kind and amount of descriptive matter labels should contain and as to
whether the deception implicit in false and misleading containers and in
goods whose pleasing exteriors belie their general inferiority are to be per-
mitted. On the side of the seller, the interest is partly one of the practical
feasibility of disclosure and partly one of the legitimacy of withholding
information. Should the manufacturer of Aunt Melinda's Pies be com-
pelled to print his recipe on the label and thereby divulge to his competitor
a valuable trade secret? On the side of the consumer, the immediate con-
cern is to guard the usual expectations of the consumer class represented
in the sale, in order that deception may be avoided. 20
Because of the seller's and producer's inherently superior capacity to
know the ingredients and the capacities of elaborately fabricated com-
modities, the consumer's vulnerability on this score has greatly increased
since the last century, and it is in the face of subtle institutional shifts like
20 A possible compromise: Filing of the recipe or formula with a governmental or
responsible private agency for secret test and published approval or rejection. Compare
the compromise achieved under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938.
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this increasing lag in consumer sophistication that the consumer turns to
the law for new protections. One of the broader questions thus raised is
how far the law ought to go beyond the mere prohibition of positive decep-
tion and impose on the seller or manufacturer a duty of educating the
consumer in the character and utility of his product. Further, to what
degree should the law require the seller to step beyond affirmative dis-
closure and subsidize, upon pain of absolute liability, the normal expecta-
tions of the consumer in the transaction? Courts are having such an issue
thrust squarely upon them in "food suits" brought by the consumer against
the manufacturer. In states in which contractual privity requirements are
fatal to warranty claims, suits sounding in "negligence", where actual
culpability or due care is impossible of ascertainment in the given case,
raise the practical if not legal issue whether the court, after due lip service
to unworkable principles, is to leave the loss where it fell or place it on a
normally careful producer who is nevertheless in a better position to guard
against such risks or to effectuate a sort of consumer insurance by increasing
prices to cover the costs of absolute liability.
Producer, seller and buyer have legitimate interests here and these
interests must somehow be reconciled "in the public interest."
Perhaps the fiercest consumer antagonisms are to be found in the second
principal phase of consumer interest, the interest of consumers in paying
as little as possible for the satisfaction of their wants. Here, again, the
public has an interest in reconciling the desire of the producer or retailer
to get the highest price for the least value given with the desire of the con-
sumer to get as much as he can in return for as little as possible. Reconcili-
ation of these interests does not necessarily spell price fixing, but even those
economists who disclaim all affiliation with "fair price" theories must con-
cede the social desirability of spreading the effective purchasing power over
as wide a base as possible, as well as of keeping the productive agencies of
economic society profitable and otherwise attractive enough to assure their
continued existence.
THE CONSUMER HAS A DUAL PERSONALITY
(As HAVE THE SELLER, MANUFACTURER AND LABORER)
In resolving the enumerated issues, it is important to keep in mind the
difference between those issues touching substantive consumer needs and
those which involve only the prices at which those needs are met. In the
former cases, it is useful to recall Adam Smith's observation that "con-
sumption is the sole end and purpose of all production" and to remember,
therefore, that with the reservations already made (and with some to,
follow) the needs of the consumer should be the principal test. But to the
extent that pure price questions are involved the consumer's claim to
preferment ordinarily disappears and the issue between buyer and seller
becomes one of spreading purchasing power and fairly apportioning the
revenue burden. Let us examine these notions a little more fully.
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Parenthetically, it should be stated that the present discussion does
not purport to be a sociological description of what is involved in every
sale or in every economic issue affecting a sale, or involved to the same
degree in all cases where descriptively it has some measure of aptness. As
such it would be, if not largely misinformation, at least unverified assump-
tion without the buttressing of statistical and factual data which are not
now available. What is attempted however is a functional analysis, by
types, of ultimate poles and frames of reference which, though they are not
always reached in actual circumstance, are almost always in some measure
approached. Such a study of tendencies and potentialities gives us valuable
standards against which to measure the concrete and actual. If such a
project is unwarrantably abstract, let the mathematician put aside his
probability curves and the philosopher his schemes of ethics.
In ideal, the ultimate function of the legal order is to facilitate the
achievement for society of the maximum of satisfaction for its individual
constituents. In pursuance of this goal the law should encourage the ful-
fillment of "legitimate" human desires, including those desires which fall
within the scope of the present inquiry. It seems, therefore, that the heavy
burden of proof should be upon him who would impede the commercial flow
of satisfactory goods to the ultimate consumer. Most manufacture, com-
merce, and business enterprise are devoid of ultimate meaning except in
terms of material human needs to be satisfied. On this score, then, the
interest of the consumer, if not fully synonymous with the public interest,
is at least almost wholly consistent with it and, it would seem, as little
compromise as possible should be called for.
In short, so far as the substantive needs of the consumer depend upon
the respective purchases by which those needs are to be satisfied, the buyer
and seller should stand in the relationship, metaphorically speaking, of
master and servant, and not in any sense on a parity. In the hierarchy of
values involved in this dimension, the consumer's wants are the central
value and any conflicting value or demand should be required to "show
cause."
Contrast the wholly different economic relationship between consumer-
buyer and seller in matters purely of price. Here their positions are not
complementary in the great division of effort. Service and subservience
ought to disappear. For within the area of price differential which measures
their initial disagreement and below that figure at which the consumer
would be discouraged from buying, buyer and seller stand in the relation-
ship of active competitors, in the true sense of that word. The higgling
buyer and seller "bargain", true, but in the very act of bargaining 2' the
parties are competing with each other within the price differential for a
division of purchasing power available for use in future transactions.
21 As future buyer, the real man will step into a new and distinct role in which he will be
a "consumer." But even in the immediate transaction in which this person is a "seller",
he has an interest as potential buyer.
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Buyer and seller are not competitors in the sense that they compete as
potential buyers for the product of the same or even similar sellers (the
buyer may want to win the price differential to use to purchase a radio,
seller to buy a water softener or to give to a church). However, they are
competitors in the accurate sense of that term in that each wants the same
thing (as much of the price as possible) for the same general purpose (to
strengthen his position as buyer or donor in future transactions). Thus in
much of the bargaining struggle there is a strain of pure competition.
Briefly to summarize, the seller is servant22 to the buyer in one aspect
of the relationship, because it is the very essence of his social function to
minister to the buyer's material needs. In another aspect, the seller is
competitor to the buyer because being a person and not merely an abstrac-
tion, the seller is also, even in this transaction, acting as a potential consumer-
buyer-in-future-transactions and has, therefore, the same interest as the
buyer in procuring the price differential for himself.
If this analysis is sound, it follows that the consumer has no such claim
to have preferment where price alone 23 is at the root of the issue in ques-
tion. Issues between buyer and seller on this plane become those of finding
a fair balance between persons who, in the absence of qualifying circum-
stances, should be treated as equals.
What has been said in connection with the buyer-seller relationship is
applicable also to the relationship between the consumer-buyer and those
persons who stand behind the seller (middleman, manufacturer, employees
of seller and middleman and manufacturer, and owner). As to the con-
sumer's substantive needs, not only the seller, but the manufacturer,
laborer, and owner, stand subservient to the consumer, because relative to
these goods and their flow to the consumer their only economic and social
function is to serve his needs.
Again, contrast their relationship in the closely related but quite distinct
pure price plane. On this level qualitative differences disappear. It has
been aptly said that seller, middleman, manufacturer, worker, and owner
22 And in this sense somewhat of a fiduciary. See, for example, Uniform Sales Act
§15 (1), 1915 P. L. 543, Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon 1931) tit. 69, §124.
23 The line between matters involving immediate "substantive" needs and those involving
only "pure price" demands is sometimes difficult to draw. At least, superficial appraisals
here are treacherous. For example: What about the suit made of inferior cloth? This
looks at first like a matter involving consumer's substantive need. Look again. If the
only result of the inferior quality of the article is the shortening of the useful life of the
article and the buyer can (and probably will) make a satisfactory replacement in the
market when it wears out at a price he feels able to afford, the significant loss, it can be
argued, will be only a money one. Of course, this will not excuse a seller or manufacturer
who has actively deceived the buyer, but such an analysis puts the consumer in a different
frame of reference from that to which superficial examination would have placed him.
Such possibilities as embarrassment or disappointment would seem to be truly "sub-
stantive." It is another question , of course, as to how much weight they should be given
in the particular case.
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all compete with each other for the consumer's dollar. This statement
becomes a truer picture of the situation when we say that seller, middle-
man, manufacturer, worker, owner, and consumer all compete for the con-
sumer's dollar. Although with reference to a particular commodity their
respective roles are defined in terms of "labor," "capital," and so forth,
yet with reference to what each party seeks out of the transaction pattern
in its money phase the parties stand in the true relationship of active
competitors for a given quantum of purchasing power. 24 In such a contest
why should one party be given any ultimate preference?25
Let us see how specific problems may be approached in the light of this
analysis.
THE CONSUMER STAKE IN LABOR PROBLEMS
Situation No. 1. Suppose a labor union goes out on strike for the sole
purpose of blocking the adoption by their employer of a process that means
a commodity better suited to the needs of consumption, but which also
means an appreciable amount of at least temporary technological unem-
ployment. 26 According to the notion of public interest developed, this issue,
involving the qualitative aspects of the commodity is, presumptively at least,
24 How can this analysis be justified, it may be asked, in view of the obvious fact that
the consumer is not so likely to deal with single individuals as with impersonal enterprises
like chain stores, department stores, mail order houses, and supermarkets? How, likewise,
can the large manufacturing corporation compete in price matters with the consumer as
potential consumer-in-future-transactions when obviously, not being a real person, it has
no interest in consumption? But such an objection looks at form rather than substance.
The policies of even "soul-less" corporations are directed by individuals for whom the
maintenance or increase in the corporate receipts means the ultimate maintenance or
increase in their compensation. Such persons are "potential-consumers-in-future-trans-
actions," and such persons are for all present purposes "the corporation."
25 Thus, even that traditional arch defender of the free competitive system, the Supreme
Court of the United States, not long ago vindicated the notion that the consumer is not
always entitled to the lowest price he can squeeze out of his producer. In Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. (1933) it permitted a large number of producers in
the buyer-dominated coal industry to band together in a price-and-production-affecting
scheme designed to protect the industry from chaos.
26 See, for example, United States v. Carrozzo, 37 Fed. Supp. 191 (N. D. Ill. 1941) where
several building-trades unions struck against the use of labor saving truck-mixers, which
the court acknowledged mixed "a better and more uniform quality of concrete" (caveat:
See note 23). The reasonableness of the strike was not in direct issue, however, because
"the test of a violation of the Sherman Act is not that a demand or a strike is unreasonable,
but that the restraint upon interstate commerce is unreasonable." In Bayer v. Brother-
hood of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers, 108 N. J. Eq. 257, 154 Atl. 759 (1931) the
strike was intended to end the use of spray guns, which required fewer men that painting
by hand. The opinion does not indicate that spray work is more satisfactory in quality;
but that seems to be a fair assumption. An injunction was denied.
Some of these cases are complicated by the fact that the union made its demand in the
alternative: either don't use the improved technology or use it and pay the same number
of laborers as before. If the former alternative is taken by the employer, the consumer's
substantive needs are affected; if the latter, his pocketbook only (see infra). But until
the employer acts, how shall we classify the controversy?
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to be resolved in favor of the consumer, him who is the ultimate end of
business and commerce. The burden of proof, therefore, should be upon
the union to show why the strike should not be considered as being for an
unlawful purpose. How much the consumer should be forced to compromise
temporarily or permanently, should depend upon the difficult question of
degree of hardship threatened and the means actually available for
alleviating that hardship. Especially if oiled by an improved system of
vocational training, the very imperfect working of the principle which
holds that technological progress provides its own compensatory oppor-
tunities may help in the given instance to solve the long-run difficulty
caused by technological unemployment, perhaps with the aid of public or
private (possibly union-sponsored) employment services geared especially
for the purpose. Sometimes the difficulty can be minimized even beforehand
by attempted forecasting of technical change and the attendant degree of
displacement to be expected, as well as by a better timing of the introduction
of revolutionary technical improvements to periods of comparative pros-
perity. The more acute short-run hardship can ofttimes be alleviated by
other means than consumer compromise, as for example through the
dismissal wage or outright unemployment compensation.27
It is not the purpose of this discourse to answer all the difficult questions
which arise in any balancing of economic and social interests. However,
the suggestion is thrown out for what it is worth that temporary or even
semi-permanent unemployment compensation is a sounder alternative than
keeping men at work on jobs which have no further social function than to
furnish an excuse for paying them a dole, especially when the latter manner
of distributing purchasing power means the unnecessary compromise of
those ultimate material values which it is the primary duty of the economic
system to serve. Unemployment compensation is more forthright than a
"sales tax" on the consumers of affected articles. Furthermore, it is less
expensive because it is not intended to be a permanent solution and its
costs can be more equitably spread in the form of taxes than can the costs
of fortifying a status quo against the push of technological progress. But
the wisdom or folly of this suggestion is beside the point for present pur-
poses because whatever the means of alleviation adopted it is true that to
the extent that such palliatives fail to remove socially undesirable labor
hardships, the consumer can be required to practice patience and perhaps
even a degree of permanent forbearance. Beyond this, however, the
consumer's needs alone should control.
Situation No. 2. But suppose, instead, that the union strikes for the sole
27 For a general discussion of the problem of technological unemployment see, Technol-
ogy in Our Economy, Monograph No. 22, Temporary National Economic Committee,
Washington, D. C., U. S. Govt. Printing Off., 1941; Douglas, Technological Unemploy-
ment (1930) 37 American Federationist 923-950. Douglas and Director, The Problem of
Unemployment (1931) pp. 121-158. See more generally, "Unemployment" (1934) 15,
Encyc. Soc. Sciences and appended bibliography.
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purpose of securing a wage increase (or of blocking a wage decrease) an
objective which has obvious relationship to the price at which the consumer
will have to buy.28 The relation of consumer to adversary in this case, it
is readily seen, is in sharp contrast to that involved under the first
hypothesis. Here the substantive needs of the consumer are not at stake, 2
and the problem is the quite different one of equitably apportioning pur-
chasing power between consumer, worker, manufacturer, and the others,
all competing as potential buyers-in-future-deals.
In making such an apportionment some difficulty is encountered in the
fact that with most widely sold articles "the consumer" is an unwieldy
heterogeneous animal composed of persons who in this role remain largely
anonymous and whose money needs as real persons are hardly to be
individually appraised, let alone generalized.30 The worker, on the other
hand, is identifiable as comprising that much narrower and more uniform
group of real persons who have worked on this article. Such a group, as
a group, may be aptly characterized in terms of purchasing power as "needy"
or "well off".
The solution of the apportionment problem in the particular case would
seem to depend upon our judgment of how high proportionately the wages
of this particular group ought to be, as compared with the returns of the
seller, manufacturer, middleman, and people in general. No comparison
can be made with the consumer in most cases because of the consumer's
28 1 assume here, perhaps too readily, that an increase in wages means a necessary
increase in price to the consumer. This is not an inevitable consequence, of course,
because the wage raise may be absorbed out of the employer's profit, if any. This is
likely to be true in the case of many ten cent or even seventy-five cent articles. Whether
the rise in labor cost is passed on to the consumer will probably be determined in large
part by the quality of competition in the field and the extent to which retail prices have
become institutionalized. The rationale of existing law is apparently that the blood of
the consumer (in case the retail price is increased) is in all cases on the hands of the em-
ployer rather than the striking employee, since there is almost universally approval of the
wage strike, or else that we have no remedy that is not worse than the disease. Keller,
Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940) §85. However, generally speaking, I be-
lieve my assumption to be substantially correct wherever labor costs represent a large
factor in cost of production, especially with goods piiced at more than a dollar and where
like labor pressure is being brought throughout the industry more or less simultaneously.
In any event, I can raise a clean-cut "pure price" issue between consumer and laborer by
supposing that the union tries directly to affect the price at which the employer sells.
See, e.g., Standard Engraving Co., Inc. v. Volz, 200 App. Div. 758, 193 N. Y. Supp. 831
(1922) where such an attempt was held unlawful under the local anti-trust law.
29 I am supposing a case in which the price difference involved threatens no change in
the scope of the market for the article. Cases involving such a change are considered later.
30 This is not always true. Consider, for example, the matter of consumer credit.
Installment buying is done in large part by those whose general purchasing power is modest
(81,000 to $2,000 yearly income), so that to a limited extent instalment buyers can be
tagged in terms of price needs. See Sienkiewicz and Vergari, Regulation of Consumer
Instalment Credit (1941) 16 Temp. L. Q. 6. Something similar can be said of the caviar
lover.
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normally heterogeneous makeup. Therefore, the consumer as such can
ordinarily be omitted from the estimate wherever the problem is purely
one of distributing purchasing power, because lacking uniformity of need
the consumer group taken as a whole cannot be said to possess propor-
tionately either too much purchasing power or too little. That is not to
say that there is no legitimate consumer claim to a low price. The very
breadth of the consumer group in respect to any given commodity makes
it a most desirable recipient of price advantages after obvious discrepancies
in particular adversary groups have been taken care of, because in most
cases it means the widest possible diffusion of purchasing power. Thus,
the wider the existing market for the article, the more reason there is for
giving the price advantage to the consumer, especially where a necessity
is involved. This is possibly one explanation why the Department of
Justice has kept so busy with milk and bread anti-trust prosecutions.
Having made this general qualification let us vary our second situation
slightly. Suppose the union strikes to block the adoption of a pro-
cess that means a commodity equally suitable to the consumer's needs
but a cheaper one by virtue of the fact that a certain number of laborers
may now be dispensed with (again technological unemployment, as in our
first case, but this time with a different value to the consumer). 31  As in
our unmodified second situation, the qualitative needs are not at stake,3 2
31 For example, see United States v. Carrozzo, 37 Fed. Supp. 191 (N. D. Il. 1941). The
truckmixer not only made a better quality of concrete but made it more cheaply because
it reduced labor costs. See also Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. 912 (C.C.A. 8th, 1897),
where an injunction was granted against striking employees of a barrel company seeking
to eliminate the use of machines for hooping barrels, which materially lessened costs. In
Dubrow Pure Food, Inc. v. Glazel, 263 N. Y. 589, 189 N. E. 712 (1933) the court held it
unlawful for unions to picket an employer who had discontinued his restaurant in favor of
a cafeteria, thus dispensing with the services of waiters. Accord: Welinsky v. Hillman,
185 N. Y. Supp. 257 (Sup. Ct. 1920). On the other hand, in C. B. Rutan Co. v. Local
Union, No. 4, Hatters' Union of America, 97 N. J. Eq. 77, 128 AtI. 622 (1925) the court
declined to enjoin a strike by hat finishers to force the re-establishment of an unprofitable
"making" shop shut down by the employer when he discovered it cheaper to buy hat bodies
than make them. These cases are cited not for their holdings but to show that such con-
troversies are not purely hypothetical. The ironical fact is that in almost none of the
reported cases (see also cases cited in note 26) are the interests of the consumer even
mentioned, let alone weighed. Certainly where quality of article is at stake, it would seem
fair to recognize that the consumer has at least some stake in the controversy inasmuch
as the whole purpose of business in its employment of labor is to serve his needs. Instead,
so long as labor doesn't monkey directly with prices, the courts treat the labor controversy
as a sort of football game against capital, against the consumer at best a paying spectator.
32 Same assumption as in note 29. In order to avoid other confusing complications in
the text, I have skirted several problems which may have occurred to the reader. For
example, I have just assumed a cheaper product but one equally good in quality. Of
course, if the technological device or process struck against means a better product, we
have a combination of hypothesis No. 1 and hypothesis No. 2, as modified (this, indeed,
was the very situation in U. S. v. Carrozzo, 37 Fed. Supp. 191 (N. D. Ill. 1941). Suppose,
however, that the device or process means not only a cheaper product but a poorer one.
This frequently arises in the analogous situation of the "sale" of entertainment, where
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and the problem is again one of apportioning the available purchasing
power between consumer, worker, and the others, all as potential buyers-
in-future-transactions.
The solution of such a problem is not so easy as it might first appear.
On the side of the union the obvious argument is that it is absurd to argue
about apportionment of purchasing power when the obvious and immediate
result of taking away a man's job is to strip him altogether of the power
to purchase his needs. But there is also a respectable argument for the
consumer. On his behalf it can be contended that the price reduction
resulting from the technological advance, with its attendant "temporary"
unemployment, means actually more purchasing power for existing custo-
mers for this kind of article released for filling other needs. The argument
is completed by the contention that the laborer is a person and being a
person will also be benefited as a consumer or potential consumer of this
article, so long of course as we can help him across the unemployment
canon with such aid as may be necessary. Of course, what he may gain
as a future consumer of this article will be very slight, but he will be buying
many articles and although no assurance can be given of definite economic
compensation to specific individuals, the cumulative savings to him and
to other labor groups resulting from a general application of this policy
may on the average be considerable. In short, the argument is that in
the aggregate of such changes of employment the affected laborers as
persons stand to gain in the long run more purchasing power as consumers
than they lose as laborers.
If such a solution were arrived at and labor were required to capitulate
in a pure price matter, how could we rationalize this with the notion that,
as competitors for purchasing power, consumer-buyer and worker, et al,
stand on a parity? Let us scrutinize our concepts a little more closely.
"Consumer," by definition, is a concept which encompasses all buyers
and would-be buyers of this article, which the worker has made and the
the typical case is the strike to compel the management to employ live musicians instead
of mechanical ones (Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. (2d) 349, cert.
denied 62 S. Ct. 477 (1941) or to employ a "full" orchestra instead of a skeleton one
(Haverill Strand Theatre, Inc. v. Gillen, 229 Mass. 413, 118 N. E. 671 (1918). See also
Motion Picture Machine Projectionists Protective Union v. Rialto Theatre Co., 17 Atl. (2d)
836 (Del. 1941). If you talk price, you tnd the consumer interest at odds with the union.
If you talk quality, the consumer and striker would seem to be on the same sid'e of the fence.
The immediate issue, it seems to me, is only to determine the consumer's net interest, in
order to know what is at stake. This tussle, then, is not consumer-labor, or even inter-
consumer, but rather intra-consumer in the sense that it involves the conflict of the con-
sumer's predominating substantive wants in this entertainment or these goods as against
those extremely speculative and much diversified (consumer by consumer) substantive
future wants which will be frustrated to the extent of the price increase. After making
this somewhat uncertain determination of what the "average" individual consumer's
long run interest is, you come out with either a net price interest threatened, by the union
(cf. note 28) or a net substantive interest threatened by the employer. From there on
the text analysis is applicable.
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seller has sold. This includes, of course, the man who is here playing the
role of worker. Thus the real man's divergent interests split, appearing in
economic discussion as included on the one hand in the abstract concept
"worker" and on the other in the abstract concept "consumer." And
like the "consumer" concept, the "worker" concept is two-fold. It includes
the real man's interest in the substantive aspects of his job (satisfactory
working conditions) and also the money aspect, which represents his
weapon for doing battle as buyer in future transactions.
Observe that there is no overlapping of the "consumer" and "worker"
concepts here. To the extent that the real man's interest as a future buyer
rests on his wages, the wherewithal to buy any article, his interest is pro-
tected as part of a more inclusive "worker" interest. To the extent,
however (and watch closely here) that this same man's interest as a future
buyer of this article (which he has helped to make) is concerned with its
good quality or low price, his interest is protected as part of the broadly
inclusive "consumer" interest. "Hairsplitting" or no, the distinction has
firm root in usage and failure to recognize it means only prolonging an
unfortunate confusion. The distinction is interesting because it means
that the numerator of the wages-price ratio which represents actual pur-
chasing power is weighed in the "worker" category while the denominator
is lumped under the "consumer" heading. (Here is further proof that one
must never confuse the real man with any of his several and simultaneous
abstractions or groupings of "him").
Thus where the issue is "fair price" versus "fair wages," consumer faces
laborer as a competitor for a given quantum of purchasing power, so far
as purchasing power is dependent upon the wherewithal to buy (i.e., the
numerator in future transactions). 33 Where on the other hand the worker
is asked to surrender his job so that the consumer may have a cheaper
article, provision having been made for a new job or for unemployment
compensation or other substitute, the decision is made on the assumption
that the consumer interest is paramount, i.e., that in the aggregate of such
shifts of employment the average individual laborer as a person stands to
gain in the long run more purchasing power as a consumer than he loses
as a laborer. In such a controversy consumer and laborer groups are not
competitors.
But there is also an added reason why the worker might be required to
yield to the consumer interest in the case supposed, if another factor is
present. In case the difference in price means the widening of the market
for the article so as to make it available for the first time to a substantial
number of persons who have heretofore been consumers only in the potential
sense that they desired this general type of article but felt unable to afford
it,34 or involves the narrowing of an existing market, we have on the con-
33 In the immediate tug of war, the buyer views the differential as denominator (price),
the seller as numerator (profit). But each hopes to use it in the future as numerator.
34 Compare the situations supposed in notes 29 and 32.
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sumer side not only the interest of actual buyers in future purchasing power,
but also a substantive consumer interest. This substantive interest is, of
course, the interest in procuring this article for the satisfaction of existing
wants.
Again, the difference between the consumer's substantive wants and his
pure price demands is not always obvious. 35 If the consumer is already
purchasing the article, his only interest in its price is the interest of one
who is thinking in terms of his position in future transactions. If, however,
the consumer has been persuaded that he cannot afford the article, that part
of the price differential which means the difference between buying and not
buying represents his substantive interest, for at least as disappointing as
a defective article is no article at all. Thus, where the extent of the market
is substantially affected, our situation is thrown back to that extent to
become substantially like our hypothesis No. 1. (strike against the use of
work-saving device for improving quality of product.)
As to those commodities which are already available to almost everyone,
slight fluctuations of price involve probably only that aspect of the consumer
interest which is competitive with like interests of seller, manufacturer and
worker. The same is probably true of even less widely enjoyed articles,
where the price differential involved is not large enough to entail an appreci-
able change in the breadth of the market. Where the price differential is
so large, the consumer stake is both "substantive" (as to those individuals
who may now be buying or kept from buying this article for the first time)
and a "pure price" consideration (as to those who will purchase anyway). 3
This illustrates the important fact that even though they are quite
distinct there is an intimate relationship between substantive and pure
price considerations. The consumer's original desire for the article in
question as well as his later satisfaction with it are functions both of quality
and price. If the price of a particular grade persuades him that he cannot
afford it after unavailing attempts to wangle a price compromise, he will
choose an inferior grade within his minimum requirements which he can
afford, and will try to forget what he could not attain. If price is no object
he will consider only his substantive needs. In most cases, however, price
is important, and since the fulfillment of future wants will be threatened
by too generous spending in the present transaction, the consumer's im-
mediate concern is to balance competing wants, present against future, in
making the determination of that top price he can "afford" to pay in the
present transaction. That tentative estimate made, the bargaining may
proceed. At any one moment, however, the consumer is likely to have one
35 Supra, note 23.
36 "Once a certain scale of living has been attained, the average consumer evidently
prefers, when income decreases, to spread his expenditures over a wide variety of low-
quality goods rather than to concentrate his buying power on fewer items of higher quality"
Waite, and Cassady, The Consumer and the Economic Order (1939) 57, and see pp. 53-58.
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of his two basic interests tentatively fixed in his mind, the other elastic. 37
THE LABORER, ALSO, HAS His SUBSTANTIVE NEEDS
Situation No. 3. Suppose a labor union goes out on strike for the purpose
of blocking the adoption of a process that means a commodity equally
suitable to the needs of the consumer but a much cheaper one by virtue
of the fact that certain costly mechanical precautions whose principal pur-
pose is to insure the safety or health of the worker have been dispensed
with.38 Here, again, the consumer's qualitative needs are not at stake,
assuming no appreciable widening of the market, but only his interest
as potential buyer-in-future-transactions. The difference between this
hypothesis and the preceding one lies in the nature of the adversary interest
at stake. Here the worker's interest is not merely one in future purchasing
power (i.e., wages) but in his immediate substantive needs. The worker is
demanding a due consideration of his immediate health, safety and happi-
ness, to the extent that they are dependent on his work. In this respect he
is no mere competitor for the consumer's dollar. This is our first hypothet-
ical situation in reverse, and a like principle ought to govern: Substantive
needs should presumptively prevail over antagonistic pure price wants.
This, of course, is no more of an absolute rule than it was in our first appli-
cation of it. If the price differential at stake is considerable and the worker
hazard is slight, it may be for the best interests of all, as real persons, to
swing the balance in favor of the consumer. Otherwise the worker reigns
supreme.
37 This is due partly to the fact that one factor is normally more important to him at
any given moment and partly to the fact that the human mind prefers to deal with one
variable at a time. Thus if the prospective buyer determines that he cannot afford more
than $150 for a radio-phonograph but that that amount is about the minimum a high
fidelity machine can be bought for, he will tend to peg $150 in his mind and hunt for the
best machine he can at that price. However, if he sees what he wants for $165, he will
momentarily put quality questions aside and concentrate on driving a bargain for that
machine at $150.
38 Suppose for example that the employer is a paint maker who persists in using as a
solvent the highly dangerous benzol (benzene) C6H instead of substituting a much less
harmful but more expensive benzol derivative like toluol (COH.CH3), which is much
less toxic and volatile, or xylol (C0 H 4.(CH 3) 2), which is very toxic but much less volatile.
The possible situations here are myriad. To get a fair idea of the potential dynamite
here, see Read and Harcourt, The Essentials of Occupational Diseases (1941) and appended
bibliography. Examine especially the chart insert at p. xiv for a picture (industry by
industry) of potential health hazards. For a labor slant on the problem, read Burnham,
Dangerous Jobs (1933) International Pamphlets, No. 34.
But why are there few if any reported labor disputes raising this issue? Are all em-
ployers altruistic? Or do the selfish ones yield readily to union pressure in order to fore-
stall adverse publicity? At least such controversies do arise. Experts of the Industrial
Hygiene Foundation tell me that a Pittsburgh steel company only recently yielded to
strike pressure to submit to an expensive investigation and reduction of a serious lead
hazard. The Bayer case, (supra note 26) might well have involved this problem, since
paint spraying usually entails substantial health hazards.
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Unfortunately, what should be only an occasional exception to a rule
favoring the worker's substantive welfare has in too many cases been itself
the rule. Here, it seems to me, is a place where the consumer may well
have been receiving more than his due. Silicosis, mine-burials alive, sewer
asphixiations, and other occupational hazards of a serious or substantial
kind have too long been accepted complacently. On the one hand, it is
good to know that such institutions as workmen's compensation are an
established reality, despite the fact that too few of these remedial statutes
provide compensation for occupational diseases and even though their added
costs are in large part passed on to the consumer. But unfortunately mere
money, whether received in the form of compensation or in the form of
wages made sufficiently high to offer a persuasive economic lure, is hardly
a satisfactory answer to crippled bodies and lives in any society in which
economic compulsion continues to play a disproportionate role in the
selection and retention of jobs.
It is the principal purpose of this discussion to define the consumer's
substantive wants, to distinguish them from his pure price demands and to
point out that either or both may have to risk compromise with the sub-
stantive as well as pure price demands of the employer, seller, middleman,
manufacturer, owner and employee. In such a project I can do little more
than suggest that, like the consumer, each of his adversaries has both his
substantive as well as his money demands. The latter are probably self-
evident, but the job of defining the worker's, et al, substantive wants needs
doing. For present purposes I merely suggest that there are such sub-
stantive wants and that generally speaking they are as valid as those of
the consumer.
Situation No. 4. Suppose, then, that substantive wants are at stake on
both sides. 3 That is, suppose that the elimination of precautionary devices
means not merely a cheaper article for the consumer but rather a better
one. Should it make any difference whether the worker's physical and
mental welfare is asked to bow to the consumer's substantive needs rather
than to his mere price demands? Probably. At least we can say that of
the consumer's two principal interests the former deserves the stronger
protection, other factors constant. In this, then, we have a fourth and
distinct situation: consumer's substantive needs versus adversary's sub-
39 This situation arises comparatively infrequently, since the typical case of serious
occupational hazard is usually avoidable at some increased expense (which may or may not
be passed on to the consumer) without necessarily sacrificing the quality of the end result
desired. But it is far from rare. For example, the milling of flour under the processes
used today to achieve a finer quality of flour than was obtainable with the old water-driven
grinding mill entails a serious flour-dust explosion hazard that appears at present to be
unavoidable. Viscose rayon workers are exposed to two substantial poison dangers.
"So far, however, it has not been possible to eliminate these dangers completely even with
the best efforts of the engineers." Survey of Carbon Disulphide and Hydrogen Sulphide
Hazards in the Viscose Rayon Industry, Com. of Pa., 193, Dept. of Labor and Industry,
Occupational Disease Prevention Division, Bulletin No. 14, p. 5.
[Vol. 8
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
stantive needs. Here the elements which made for competition in the
econd situation are wholly lacking. Who should yield here?
In the abstract, the parties stand again on equal footing. However, this
time they face each other not as mere economic competitors for a quantum
of economic power, but as man and man, each seeking immediate want
fulfillments incompatible with those of the other. There is no problem of
apportioning purchasing power; rather, the analogous one of distributing
immediate substantive satisfactions- In such a struggle the worker has as
much right to fit working conditions as the buyer has to a fit product. But
no simple yardstick can be laid down. A just result here depends upon
making a common sense estimate of the respective hardships. Thus, if
the advantages to the consumer are slight and the dangers to the worker
great, the solution seems obvious. Likewise, in the converse situation.
Where the scales are evenly poised, you flip a coin or contrive a compromise.
In between there is every gradation.
CONSUMER VS. MANUFACTURER OR PRODUCER
What has been said above with specific reference to issues that find the
consumer at odds with labor is in large part applicable whoever may be the
consumer's adversary in the particular controversy. In the case of the
manufacturer we have, as in the case of the laborer, not only the com-
petitive aspect in respect to pure price factors, but also the substantive
interest. What we called "fit working conditions" for the laborer may well
be expanded into the more inclusive though somewhat effete concept of
"fit conditions of endeavor." Though it may be argued that the typical
manufacturer hardly cries for "fit working conditions" in the same sense
and degree as the laborer, it is nevertheless legitimate to point out that
he is entitled at least to a certain minimum of what in fact he has been
taking. Actually, this substantive interest is rarely at stake in contro-
versies involving the consumer and, on the other side, the consumer has
no interest except to the extent any excess in the manufacturer's enjoy-
ment comes out of the consumer's pocket.
Most of the consumer's antagonisms with the manufacturer involve on
the manufacturer's side the money aspect alone, i.e., his interest as a future
consumer-buyer or donor (or in economic prestige). On the consumer's
side, however, it may typically be either quality or price of article which is
threatened by the manufacturer's attempts to enhance his own purchasing
power. Thus the manufacturer may find a greater profit available in an
inferior article than in a better one, or a greater profit in an expensive
article available to a few than in the same article available at a lower price
to many. In this latter situation, as has been previously pointed out, the
individual consumer's interest threatened may be one either of price or of
substance. If he can afford the article and buys, his loss is only a price one.
However, if he is persuaded that he cannot afford the article, his sub-
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stantive interests are affected, because he has had to forego the article
altogether.
One particular issue between the consumer and the manufacturer that
needs further exploration, is the legitimacy of burying patents, as well as
the broader problem of delaying the exploitation of technological im-
provements. (The problem of technological unemployment is not nec-
essarily involved here.) As presently protected, moreover, patents raise
monopoly and restraint-of-trade issues in which consumer gouging has
been a frequent result.4 0  Some of the problems of standardization have
already been alluded to. Likewise, the practical problem of the adop-
tion of desirable technological improvements to the demands of mass
production.
With regard to such problems it is apparent that to an extent they raise
only the problem of compromise between individual short-run consumer
demands or the problem of ascertaining in the given case the long-run
consumer interest. And to an extent they raise a real issue between con-
sumer substantive needs and manufacturer price wants.
In this connection a complication is presented. In many cases, the
ostensible issue between consumer and manufacturer may in reality be
only a discrepancy between actual buyer demand and the aggregate short-
run consumer interest in the article or a discrepancy between short-run
and long-run consumer interest. This is because the manufacturer is in a
sense a "trustee" of the consumer's long-run interest. Thus even the
"perfect" manufacturer, seeking for himself no more than his just economic
due, would nevertheless find himself frequently in a tug of war with partic-
ular consumers concerned only with their immediate demands, as for
example on a matter of standardization. To a degree, the consumer must
depend upon the manufacturer's more sophisticated judgment to determine
the best ways of getting the most satisfactory products to the greatest
number of people needing that type of product. Standardization, with-
holding patents, et cetera, may under certain circumstances be for the best
long-run interest of the consumer and of particular consumers. In other
circumstances, on the other hanfd, they may not. These practices may
benefit only the manufacturer's pocketbook at the expense of the consumer.
Under the first supposition, the manufacturer should "win." There
everybody "wins." Under the latter supposition, the situation is this: on
40 The right of the owner to suppress his patent was upheld in Continental Paper Bag
Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405 (1908). On this question generally, see Patents
and Free Enterprise, Monograph No. 31, Temporary National Economic Committee,
Washington, D. C., U. S. Govt. Printing Off., 1941, esp. pp. 57-62; Stern, Restraints upon
the Utilization of Invention (1938) 200 Annals, Suppression and Non-Working of Patents
(1919) 9 Am. Econ. Rev. 693. See also, McCormack, Restrictive Patent Licenese and
Restraint of Trade (1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 743. Lamb, The Relation of the Patent Law to
the Federal Anti-Trust Law (1927) 12 Corn. L. Q. 261. Powell, The Nature of a Patent
Right (1917) 17 Col. L. Rev. 663. On compulsory patent licensing, see Schecter, Would
Compulsory Licensing of Patents be Unconstitutional? (1936) 22 Va. L. Rev. 287.
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the consumer's side, substantive (and perhaps price) needs; on the manu-
facturer's, pure price. Therefore, under our rationale the consumer pre-
sumptively wins unless the manufacturer can "show cause," which seems
highly improbable.
One problem here which may strongly affect the public interest, but
which is too complex for extended treatment here, is the extent to which
the manufacturer, seller, et cetera, may be allowed to create consumer
want for what they have to sell rather than simply to provide what it is
assumed that the consumer already wants. To assume that it is the seller's
and manufacturer's job to provide only for a long list of static wants un-
created and unconditioned by seller manipulation is naive, because it is
the very essence of the seller's attempts at persuasion to make the prospec-
tive buyer want to buy this article. The total bargaining process is one
partially of adjusting product to need and partially of adjusting need to
product. 41 But the question of degree remains, the degree of desirability
of having this kind of want satisfied. Extreme example: It is against public
policy to permit the seller to persuade the buyer that he wants slaves or
abortifacients. More difficult example: Assuming that it is desirable to
permit the fulfillment of existing liquor wants, is it socially desirable to
permit the seller to create through advertising new appetites? Respectable
arguments could be made for the negative. Still more difficult example:
Is it socially desirable to permit sellers and manufacturers to cultivate
snob attitudes, a love of glitter without substance, and so on?42 It appears
that Consumer's Research, for one, thinks not.
On the pure price plane, there is the matter of consumer credit, including
the installment sale. For the one party we have an extra profit. For the
other, a possible invasion of his long-run interest through an overbuying
resulting in a substantive need filled but at the expense of other and perhaps
greater future needs. Here is partly a case for protecting the consumer
from himself and partly one for protecting him from the seller. The public
interest, of course, is especially strong here in view of the high inflationary
potential inherent in uninhibited consumer credit.43
Note that although in a very superficial sense there is in these cases an
issue of consumer versus seller or manufacturer, the real issue in most of
them is one mentioned earlier: consumer versus the public, but this time
with the seller pulling the consumer's wires. So, if it be determined that
it is inconsistent with the public welfare to have a certain kind of a want
satisfied (e.g., abortion) or a certain kind of want satisfied to a certain
degree (e.g., intoxicating liquor, or rubber and chromium in a nation at
war) then it should be equally against the public interest to permit the
41 For factors affecting consumer choice, see Wyand, supra, note 8, Part III.
42 Consumer demand manipulation is considered in Waite and Cassady, Supra note
16, Chap. XI.
43 See Sienkiewicz and Vergari, supra note 30, pp. 11-14; Consumer Credit (1938) 196
Annals; Nugent, Consumer Credit and Economic Stability (1939) Russell Sage Foundation.
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seller or manufacturer to attempt a seduction. Although such a generality
can be swallowed with the greatest of ease, it is of course another matter
to digest the content of the term "public interest" in specific cases.
But the foregoing issue is not economic at all. It is a moral and social
one which it is not the province of price economics to answer.
AFTER "FREE ENTERPRISE," WHAT THEN?
Does the rationale of this analysis presuppose a capitalistic system, one
of "free enterprise," or any system? Is it applicable in a socialistic regime
or in a system not dependent upon the profit motive? What amendments
in our analysis will have to be made in case we are to be engulfed by some
economic "wave of the future"?
I believe that, as already stated, the consumer rationale is substantially
correct for either or any economic system. However, on the side of the
various adversary groups, some allowance must be made on behalf of any
system which is dependent for its functioning upon the profit motive. If
the only way to induce the seller to sell, the manufacturer to make, the
owner to lend, or the worker to work, is to allot him a certain quantum of
purchasing power, then to that extent the money element must be classed
as a fundamental substance which economically the adversary has a right
to demand. It is only over and above that minimum inducement necessary
to set the various transaction patterns in motion that we have the area in
which it can be truthfully and accurately said that consumer, seller and
worker are competitors. This competed-for "price differential" belabored
above is not the difference between what the seller would like to be paid
for the article (i.e., the asking price) and zero, but the difference between
what the seller would like to be paid (or that figure which would discourage
the particular buyer from buying, whichever is lower) and some figure
hovering a little higher than cost. The difficulty of ascertaining this figure
of minimum inducement as well as the point of consumer discouragement
makes it difficult to determine the exact price area within which the parties
are competitors. Yet competitors they are.
Even the consumer's substantive interests are sometimes sacrificed to the
demands of the profit motive. The patent monopoly, for example, is offered
as a money lure, which means in many cases a price administered beyond
the means of many who could otherwise afford to buy.
Suppose a regime of governmentally regulated production and prices.
Actually, this would make little difference. Even though competition
were gone in the economic sense, the consumer still would compete with
the lobbies of his adversaries as to the price differential in legislative or
administrative halls, and unless and until men are assigned to their jobs
through governmental compulsion, the profit motive is still present. In
any event, legislators and administrators, and yes, even dictators, seeking
economic justice must weigh the consumer's interests against those of his
economic adversaries and must distinguish the immediate substantive
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satisfactions sought in the given transaction from those price wants whose
only connection with this transaction is that they offer an opportunity
for increasing or maintaining bargaining power in future transactions.
SUMMARY
As a solution to specific consumer-adversary problems much of the
foregoing analysis may well be ignored. The principal purpose of that
analysis is rather to set up and illustrate the four-fold frame of reference
from which problems involving the consumer ought to be approached. It
postulates a fundamental distinction between two wholly different kinds
of interests possessed by each individual party involved in the dispute.
First, the immediate substantive interest. With the consumer, it is a fit
product; with the seller, producer or worker, it is fit working or operating
conditions. Second, the pure price or money interest, where there is no
interest in the present transaction beyond the fact that it offers an oppor-
tunity to each to improve his position as buyer in future transactions.
With a two-fold interest on the part of the adversary, as well, it becomes
apparent that any given dispute involving the consumer must fall within
one or~more of four possible frames of reference, each presenting an entirely
different hierarchy of interests to be adjusted. When this is fully appreciated
much confusion can be avoided. Here is brief are the four planes on which
the consumer may have to expose his interests to compromise:
A. As to quality of the goods.
1. The consumer's substantive needs must be balanced
against the substantive needs of his adversary, equally
valid in the abstract.
2. The consumer's substantive needs should presumptively
prevail over adversary money demands which go beyond
that minimum price concession which may be necessary
to make workable any economic system that is dependent
upon the profit motive.
B. As to price of the goods.
1. The consumer's "pure price" demands presumptively
yield to the substantive needs of his adversary.
2. The consumer's "pure price" demands are in the abstract
just as valid as those wages, salary, and profit claims
which go beyond the minimum inducement necessary to
the functioning of any economic system dependent upon
the profit motive. In the area of this price differential,
the parties are true competitors. Caveat: Above the price
which discourages the consumer's purchase of that type
of article a substantive or qualitative consumer need is
involved. To that extent the problem is thrown back to
plane A(2).
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In actual circumstance, controversies tend to fall into more than one
of these overneat compartments. Thus a dispute over a wage and hour law
affecting only the price of the article involves, from the consumer's point
of view,44 first, on the wages side, a problem of apportioning purchasing
power, and on the hours side, principally one of securing to the worker
substantial safety and of facilitating his health and happiness in his role
as worker, with the heavy burden of proof on the consumer to show that
the advantages to him outweigh an allegedly slight hardship on this
particular worker group. Of course, if the proposed law affects also the
quality of the article, the consumer stake in the controversy becomes much
more complex. However, whatever the specific problem, it should be valu-
able to know what interests are at stake and where the burden of persuasion
lies within the frame of reference in which various segregated elements
of the composite problem fall.
In actual circumstance, moreover, controversies tend to involve more
interests than those at stake in the two-sided illustrative situations given
above, which were consciously oversimplified for the purpose of deferring
confusing complications. However, there seems to be no reason why the
analysis developed here is not adapted as well to the balancing of interests
in any multi-partied controversy.
CONCLUSION
With a new understanding of the nature of the consumer interest and
an appreciation of the fact that the "consumer" is a human activity taken
in abstraction, rather than a whole man, it becomes apparent why the con-
sumer interest is at present inadequately protected. While civilization
rested upon a discrete and localized economy, there existed no great dis-
proportion of economic forces detrimental to the consumer. With the
industrial revolution, however, and the huge concentrations of capital in
the hands of organized productive groups, a great disparity arose. Because
the necessity of attracting the consumer produced liberal concessions in his
behalf, the economic pains were soonest felt elsewhere. The worse disease
demands the earlier cure, and today we see substantial progress toward
creating, perhaps for the first time, a parity -of bargaining power between
worker and employer. But the less acute plight of the consumer has been
until recent years neglected.4 5
44 Remember that our primary interest here is the consumer. Provisions as to hours
of labor involve the welfare of the worker in his job, and the consumer has a direct interest
in so far as his quality or price wants are affected. But hours-of-labor problems involve
also, as an inter-worker problem, the aspect of distributing purchasing power with a view
to removing discrepancies internal to labor. This invites the extension of the type of
analysis developed here to controversies between-seller and manufacturer, manufacturer
and laborer, and so forth, which do not appreciably affect the consumer. But that is
beyond the scope of this paper.
45 For a summary of recent developments in the consumer movement, see Gabler,
Labeling the Consumer Movement (1939) Am. Retail Federation pp. 14-16; Sorenson,
The Consumer Movement (1941).
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The first step in achieving comprehensive consumer protection is the
ascertainment of those areas in which there exists a serious economic
inequality of bargaining power. Adjusting remedy to particular need,
such an approach tends to break down arbitrary distinctions between
commercial and non-commercial use, distinctions which fall short of sep-
arating the consumer who needs protection from the consumer who is
able to look out for himself. To repeat, the social problem is not so much
"ultimate"-consumer protection as it is helpless-consumer protection, and
each situation-type which it is feasible to treat should first be measured
for the degree of economic disparity to be dealt with before specific solu-
tion is sought.
Won piecemeal at best, bargaining equality is achieved in various ways
and the means most suitable should depend upon the needs of the immediate
economic area dealt with. The least universally satisfactory method seems
to be consumer cooperation. The negligible growth of the cooperative (in
the United States at least) suggests that the adhesive necessary to group
collaboration is somehow lacking, although organization should certainly
be encouraged where it shows promise of growth. At the opposite pole the
praiseworthy but modest success of the trust-busting facilities of the
Department of Justice makes it equally doubtful whether consumer pro-
tection is to be comprehensively assured by any wholesale atomization of
existing Big Business, a process which, even if feasible, would have doubt-
ful desirability if carried to a point where the return to a more primitive
standard of living might become imminent.
In between these more extreme measures, positive protection of the
consumer takes two general forms; direct regulation and penalization (i.e.,
legal "disarmament" of the adversary) and secondly, consumer imple-
mentation designed to enable him to protect himself. Public policy and
practical considerations of feasibility largely determine the question as to
which attack is the more desirable in particular cases. Although some
combination of both is usually inevitable, it is suggested that in a legal
order still sworn in large part to the maintenance of free competition 4"
the organization and legal and educational arming of the consumer interest
is to be given preference (wherever workable) over regulation from over-
head. Nor is this merely a matter of ideology. For example, when it can
be concentrated, the cumulative effect of individual civil actions is capable
of exerting a force fully as persuasive as that of government enforced
regulations, and it does not depend upon the aggressiveness of officials
whose incentives to action grow mainly out of the duties of office. Investi-
gation leads me to believe that this is true at least of the food business.
Finally, consumer protection of a more subtle but no less vital sort can
and should take the form of adequate consumer representation in all govern-
mental and administrative matters in which the consumer has a substantial
46 I reread this sentence with some misgivings.
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stake, whether or not he is a nominal party in interest. 47 If there be any
juice left in Adam Smith's pronouncement on the place of consumption in
the economic order it would seem wise to assure some guarantee that the
consumer should receive adequate partisan representation in a political
and legal order so responsive to business and labor pressure groups, groups
whose normal aims are only partially concerned with the welfare of the
consumer.
48
The immediate objectives, therefore, would seem to be as follows: (1) to
emphasize the true nature of the consumer interest and the necessity for
its protection and implementation, (2) fully to discover and explore those
legal and social issues in which the consumer has a vital stake, (3) to
establish frankly partisan administrative agencies to study consumer
problems, and to represent the consumer viewpoint in administrative
affairs, (4) to encourage the organization of private agencies to study and
assert the consumer interest, (5) to foster the establishment of public and
private research agencies for the development of quality standards, for the
testing of existing consumer goods, and for specific advisory purposes, (6)
adequately to arm these agencies for attack upon illegal practices by pro-
ducers and distributors (e.g., Printer's Ink statutes), (7) to educate in-
dividual consumers so far as feasible in consumer economics, 49 and (8)
adequately to arm individual consumers in their dealings with retailer or
producer so as to make redress an effective actuality in those cases where
the consumer has suffered wrong. Finally, in limiting the field of risk in
the worst areas it may be necessary to supplement the foregoing with direct
regulative legislation and criminal sanctions, but only to the extent that the
consumer himself, individually and collectively, is powerless to give himself
the desired protection. 50 In tailoring particular measures to particular situa-
tions, of course, our two fundamental considerations will not be ignored:
the degree of bargaining inequality present and the nature of the consumer
interest involved.
Altogether, the consumer seems to demand a great deal. But all he asks
is the legal and social aid necessary to restore his voice and place him on a
parity with his brothers in the bargaining struggle.
47 E.g., The Department of Agriculture maintains a Consumers' Counsel. See further,
supra, note 10, p. 97.
48 In this connection consider the conclusions found in Campbell, supra note 6, pp.
262-278.
49 Consumer education is considered in Sorenson, supra note 45, Chap. III.
50 For a summary of the legal protections now afforded the consumer consult Waite and
Cassady, supra note 16, Chaps. VII and VIII. A critical analysis of the consumer move-
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